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NOTES
With the promulgation of rule 14(e), future Chiarella-like insiders
will not escape liability, as 14(e) is addressed specifically to nondis-
closure of nonpublic tender offer information. However, the court
may be faced with a similar legal scenario that does not precisely fit
the 14(e) statutory scheme or any other SEC rule. In those situa-
tions, the court will have to trace again the liability of a person
possessing inside information from Kardon (affirmative duty to
disclose as a result of the fiduciary obligations inherent in an in-
sider's status) through In re Cady, Roberts (duty to disclose arising
out of a relationship giving access to corporate information) to the
holding in Chiarella to determine the question of liability. If there is
no statutory provision, then the court probably will also be able to
consider liability based upon the Solicitor General's misappropria-
tion theory, which was strongly urged by Chief Justice Burger.
Chiarella was not convicted-but, a future "Chiarella" in a non-
tender offer situation, even absent a specific statutory provision,
may be convicted of violating 10(b) and 10b-5."
Rodolfo J. Aguilar, Jr.
In re Grand Jury Subpoenas -JUVENILES'
RIGHT TO COUNSEL INSIDE THE GRAND JURY
Grand jury subpoenas were issued to David and Eric Graham,
ages 16 and 12, after their mother was found murdered in their
home. Their father filed a motion to quash the subpoenas. The trial
court appointed counsel to represent the minors to avoid any possible
conflict of interest, and after the argument on the motions, the court
quashed the subpoenas. The state sought to reinstate the subpeonas
and to require the attendance of the children before the grand jury.
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that it
would violate the concepts of fundamental fairness embodied in the
42. The Court was reluctant to allow Chiarella to evade liability. It is conceivable
that had the misappropriation theory been timely advanced, Chiarella's conviction
would have been affirmed. Justice Stevens' concurring opinion reflects the attitude of
the Court:
I write simply to emphasize the fact that we have not placed any stamp of
approval on what this petitioner did, nor have we held that similar actions must
be considered lawful in the future. Rather, we have merely held that petitioner's
criminal conviction cannot rest on the theory that he breached a duty he did not
owe.
Chiarella v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1108, 1120 (1980).
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Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution' to compel a
minor's attendance at a grand jury hearing without affording him
the protection of the counsel of an attorney. In re Grand Jury Sub-
poenas, 387 So. 2d 1140 (La. 1980).
Traditionally, a witness called to testify before a grand jury has
had no right to counsel.! The denial of such a right has most often
been attributed to the ancient history, the special nature, and the
constitutional prerogatives of the grand jury system. 3 The grand
jury has been a basic element of the Anglo-American criminal process
since 1166 and theoretically serves as the citizen's voice in the en-
forcement of criminal laws. The grand jury is convened as a "body
of laymen, free from technical rules, acting in secret, pledged to indict
no one because of prejudice and to free no one because of special
favor."5
The grand jury functions both as a body of accusers and as a
protector of the citizen from unfounded accusations.6 As accuser, the
grand jury inquires independently into crimes committed within its
jurisdiction and issues indictments on the finding of probable cause.
For example, in Louisiana, though a state grand jury usually acts in
response to crimes brought to its attention by the district attorney,
the grand jury's inquisitorial power is not limited to such cases, and
the grand jury may inquire into any offense triable by a district
court in the parish in which the jury sits.7 The state grand jury need
not even call witnesses, as it may indict upon the juror's own personal
knowledge of crimes.' As protector, the grand jury is supposed to
1. LA. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3 & 16.
2. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976); In re Groban, 352 U.S.
330, 333 (1957); United States v. Daniels, 461 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1972); Gilmore v.
United States, 129 F.2d 199 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 631 (1942); In re Black, 47
F.2d 542 (2d Cir. 1931); United States v. Grunewald, 164 F. Supp. 640 (S.D.N.Y. 1958);
United States v. Blanton, 77 F. Supp. 812 (E.D. Mo. 1948); State v. Williams, 310 So. 2d
528 (La. 1975). But see Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1967), rev'd on
other grounds, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970).
3. See cases cited in note 2, supra.
4. Note, Criminal Procedure-Right to Counsel in Investigative Grand Jury
Proceedings: Washington Criminal Investigatory Act of 1971-R.C.W. §§
10.27.120-.140 (1971), 47 WASH. L. REV. 511, 513 (1972). For a history of the grand jury,
see generally Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 361-62 (1956); Blair v. United
States, 250 U.S. 273, 279-83 (1919); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 59 (1906); 4 W.
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 301-03 (Lewis' ed. 1902); G. EDWARDS, THE GRAND JURY
1-44 (1906); 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321-23 (7th -ed. 1956); 1 F.
POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 151 (2d ed. 1909).
5. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
6. Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 556 (1884) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
7. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 437.
8. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 483. See State v. Vial, 153 La. 883, 96 So. 796 (1923);
State v. Richard, 50 La. Ann. 210, 23 So. 331 (1898).
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"[stand] between the accuser and the accused . . . to determine
whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an in-
timidating power or by malice and personal ill will."9 If the evidence
presented is insufficient to establish probable cause, the grand
jurors no-bill the accused,"° thus preventing hasty, malicious, or op-
pressive prosecutions. This protective function is reflected by the
fact that the declarations of fundamental rights in both the United
States and Louisiana Constitutions contain a requirement of a grand
jury indictment for all serious crimes." Largely because the grand
jury, as an independent group of citizens, is presumed to protect.the
witness' rights, 2 courts have held that a grand jury witness has no
constitutional right to counsel. 3
9. Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43,
59-66 (1906).
10. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 444. A Louisiana grand jury may also pertermit en-
tirely the matter investigated. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 444.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V; LA. CONST. art. I, § 15.
12. Many writers argue that the modern grand jury basically functions as the in-
vestigative arm of the prosecutor, which makes it unlikely for the grand jury to be
able to fulfill its traditional role as "independent protector" of the witness or the ac-
cused. The prosecutor's control of grand jury proceedings, the lack of procedural
safeguards to protect the witness' constitutional rights, and the legally binding nature
of a witness' testimony have eroded prior justifications for the exclusion of counsel.
Whether these considerations necessarily should compel the right to counsel for all
grand jury witnesses is beyond the scope of this note, though such an argument could
be very persuasive. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 602-10 (1976)
(Brennan, J., concurring); Sheridan v. Garrison, 273 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. La. 1967), rev'd
on other grounds, 415 F.2d 699 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1040 (1970);
Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before a Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D. 189 (1966); Steele, Right
to Counsel at the Grand Jury Stage of Criminal Proceedings, 36 Mo. L. REV. 193
(1971); Note, The Rights of a Witness Before a Grand Jury, 1967 DUKE L.J. 97, 122.
The redactors of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution seemed to recognize such a need for
counsel in article V, section 34, in which the legislature was authorized to provide for a
right to counsel before a grand jury. However, the legislature has yet to act upon this
grant of authority.
13. The lack of a right to counsel for a grand-jury witness has most often been
asserted in cases denying the assistance of counsel in administrative hearings. See
Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960); In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330, 333 (1957). Only one
United States Supreme Court decision has squarely addressed the question of whether
a witness has a constitutional right to be represented by counsel while testifying
before a grand jury. That case, United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1974), in
denying the existence of such a right, relied on dicta in In re Groban, 352 U.S. 330
(1957), which ruled that a witness before a grand jury cannot insist, as a matter of con-
stitutional right, on being represented by counsel. The holding also relied upon Kirby
v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689-90 (1972), for the proposition that the sixth amendment
right to counsel does not come into play until criminal proceedings (indictment or
information) have been instituted against the witness. In a concurring opinion, Justice
Brennan noted that Kirby's premise was that "the constitutional privilege against
compulsory self-incrimination is in no way implicated here." 425 U.S. at 602 (Brennan,
J., concurring), quoting Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 687 (1972). Because of the great
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Grand jury hearings are non-adversary proceedings in which no
final determination of guilt or innocence is made; rather, "[t]he func-
tion of the Grand Jury is to determine whether or not, from the
evidence before it, there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed"'14 and to see whether or not probable cause for
prosecution exists. Louisiana courts issue a subpoena for a witness
to appear before the grand jury upon the request of either the
grand jury or the district attorney. 5 The witness is administered an
oath by which he must swear to keep secret the proceedings of the
grand jury, and such secrecy cannot thereafter be invaded." Only
certain persons may be present at sessions of the state grand jury:
the members of the grand jury, the district attorney and his assis-
tants, the attorney general or an assistant attorney general, the
witness under examination, the court reporter, and an interpreter, if
necessary.1" Any other person who intentionally is present is in con-
structive contempt of court. 8 Thus, the concept of defense counsel
for a grand jury witness is not embraced by Louisiana statutory pro-
visions. Louisiana courts also have followed the tradition of ex-
cluding counsel from the grand jury room."
When called by the grand jury, the witness is legally bound to
give his testimony." This duty is based on the historic rule that
"[t]he public has a right to every man's evidence."'" However, the
grand jury's authority to compel testimony is not unlimited. The
danger of self-incrimination inherent in a grand jury interrogation, Justice Brennan
believed the "substantive affinity" of the right to counsel and the privilege against
self-incrimination should be recognized, and the sixth amendment right to counsel
should be required to protect the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination, as
was done in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
14. Eames v. Pitcher, 344 F. Supp. 207, 209 (M.D. La.), aff'd, 468 F.2d 905 (5th Cir.
1972).
15. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.
16. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 440. However, "[a] witness may discuss his testimony
given before the grand jury with counsel for a person under investigation or indicted,
with the attorney general or the district attorney, or with the court." LA. CODE CRIM.
P. art. 434. Unlike with Louisiana grand juries, federal grand jury witnesses are not
bound by an oath of secrecy. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2). There are other substantial
differences between Louisiana and federal grand jury procedures, a discussion of
which is beyond the scope of this paper. The illustrations used here in explaining the
general nature of the grand jury system are based on Louisiana law, since the instant
case involves a state grand jury.
17. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 433A. See State v. Revere, 232 La. 184, 94 So. 2d 25
(1957). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
18. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 433C.
19. State v. Williams, 310 So. 2d 528 (La. 1975).
20. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 345 (1974).
21. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976), quoting United States v.
Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 38 (No. 14,692e) (C.C. Va. 1807).
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same amendment (the fifth) that establishes the grand jury guaran-
tees that "[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.""2 The grand jury is considered a
"criminal case" at which incriminating questions need not be
answered by the witness." This privilege has great significance to a
grand jury witness because, in many instances, the very purpose of
requiring the witness' presence is to ask him incriminating questions.
Thus, this situation presents a great danger of infringement of the wit-
ness's right against self-incrimination." One has no absolute constitu-
tional right to remain silent before a grand jury." In most cases the
witness need not be informed of his privilege." The witness must
either answer the questions and risk self-incrimination or assert his
privilege and risk prejudice in the eyes of the grand jury. 7 Another
danger is that a premature or unfounded assertion of the privilege
may lead to a contempt citation. 8 Most importantly, if the privilege
is not invoked timely, it is considered waived.'
22. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
23. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562-63 (1892). See United States v.
Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943).
24. Of course, the grand jury may compel testimony which is self-incriminating in
exchange for a grant of immunity, after which the witness must speak or be held in
contempt. See LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 439.1. This is allowed because, supposedly,
"[i]mmunity displaces the danger.'- Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 439 (1956).
25. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 572 (1976).
26. See United States v. Scully, 225 F.2d 113 (2d Cir. 1955); United States v.
Gilboy, 160 F. Supp. 442, 461 (M.D. Pa. 1958). However, whenever the witness is the
focus of the investigation, he must be warned of his right against compulsory self-
incrimination before testifying. See State v. Jemison, 240 La. 787, 125 So. 2d 363
(1960); State v. Harrell, 228 La. 434, 82 So. 2d 701 (1955). Full-blown Miranda warnings
need never be given to a grand jury witness, even when the witness is the focus of the
investigation. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564 (1976).
27. The defendant in United States v. Winter, 348 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 955 (1965), envisioned a third alternative. Confronted with a blunt
question as to his guilt or innocence, the defendant saw as his alternatives the
distasteful choice of either (1) admitting his guilt, (2) claiming the fifth amendment
privilege and prejudicing the grand jury, or (3) lying and risking a perjury prosecution.
He selected the third alternative but found the court unsympathetic.
28. See Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
29. If the witness desires the protection of the privilege, he must claim it, or he
will not be considered to have been "compelled" within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment. United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424, 427 (1943). Also, "if the witness himself
elects to waive his privilege . . . and discloses his criminal connections, he is not per-
mitted to stop, but must go on and make full disclosure," unless there is a "real
danger" of further incrimination. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1951),
quoting Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 597 (1896). This waiver rule in the grand jury
room seems to threaten the fundamental right against self-incrimination and to impose
a severe threat to individual rights. See Comment, The Grand Jury Witness' Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 62 Nw. U. L. REV. 207, 219, 228-32 (1971).
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Recent cases have shown an increased concern for the protec-
tion of the constitutional rights of juveniles. 0 In re Dino,"1 a
previous Louisiana Supreme Court decision, refused to allow minors
to waive their fifth amendment right against self-incrimination by
themselves because of the general policy of Louisiana law to protect
all minors from the possible consequences of immaturity. 2 The state
now "must affirmatively show that the juvenile engaged in a meaning-
ful consultation with an attorney or an informed parent, guardian, or
other adult interested in his welfare before he waived his right to
counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.""3
In the instant case, only the two subpoenaed children, their
seven-year-old sister, and their father were at home when their
mother was murdered. The state refused to grant immunity to the
subpoenaed children, though it maintained that the children were
not suspects. Thus, in deciding whether to reinstate the grand jury
subpoenas, the court felt that it had to resolve a conflict between
the minor's right against self-incrimination and the state's interest
in protecting the integrity of the grand jury. The court opted for
the former.34 The court stressed the fact that a witness has a duty
to testify if called before a grand jury, subject only to his fifth
amendment right against self-incrimination. Considering language in
In re Dino that "most juveniles are not mature enough to under-
stand their rights and are not competent to exercise them,"35 the
court in the instant case decided that the ordinary protections for
adult witnesses were not enough to protect a child's interest.
However, the court also felt that to quash all subpoenas to minors
by the grand jury would severely limit the grand jury in its investi-
gative duties. The court held that in order to protect the grand
jury's investigative duties and the juvenile's constitutional rights,
the proper remedy was to permit the subpoenas to stand and to
allow juveniles to be accompanied by an attorney."
30. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (requiring proof beyond a reasonable
doubt for delinquency judgments); Application of Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring,
inter alia, assistance of counsel for juveniles at a delinquency proceeding); In re Jones,
372 So. 2d 779 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1979) (extending the right to counsel to juveniles
under the Louisiana Constitution).
31. 359 So. 2d 586 (La. 1978).
32. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 1785; LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4501.
33. 359 So. 2d at 594.
34. The two concepts need not be mutually exclusive, however. See notes 42-49,
infra, and accompanying text.
35. 359 So. 2d at 594.
36. The right to counsel granted to grand jury witnesses is expressly limited to
juveniles. In re Grand Jury Subpoenas, 387 So. 2d 1140, 1143 n.3 (La. 1980).
1310 [Vol. 41
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The witness' right against self-incrimination in a grand jury set-
ting supposedly is protected by the practice of allowing counsel
outside the grand jury room and permitting the witness to leave the
grand jury room at any time to consult with his attorney. 7 In
United States v. Capaldo," the court called this rule "a reasonable
and workable accommodation of the traditional investigatory role of
the grand jury, preserved in the Fifth amendment, and the self-
incrimination and right to counsel provisions of the Fifth and Sixth
amendments."3 9 Other cases have illustrated the disruptive effects
and intolerable delays which can and often do result from this prac-
tice, such as occurs when a witness leaves the grand jury room after
every question for a fifteen-minute conference with his attorney."
The instant case rejected the contention that outside counsel could
provide adequate protection for the juvenile's rights. The court
stated that such a rule "offers little protection to the witness who
may be too immature to accurately report the questions of the
prosecutor to his attorney. Nor can we assume that the inexperi-
enced minor unfamiliar with the self-incrimination privilege will
understand when to assert the privilege.""
Such language seems quite logical and practically compelled in
light of the Dino holding. Dino established three prerequisites which
the state must follow in order to show an effective waiver of a
child's right against self-incrimination. The state must show that the
juvenile actually consulted with an attorney or an adult before
waiver, that the attorney or adult consulted was interested in the
welfare of the juvenile, and that, if an adult other than an attorney
was consulted, the adult was advised fully of the rights of the juve-
nile. However, because of the isolation of the juvenile from the ad-
vice of such counsel or informed adult before a grand jury, there is a
great possibility of the occurrence of what Dino prohibits-the juve-
nile may waive unknowingly his privilege against self-incrimination.
37. See United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976); United States v.
Corallo, 413 F.2d 1306, 1330 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Capaldo, 402 F.2d 820, 824
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969).
38. 402 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 989 (1969).
39. 402 F.2d at 824.
40. See In re Evans, 452 F.2d 1239, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (Wilkey, J., dissenting)
(where at one point the witness left the grand jury room at 1:59 P.M., returned at 3:48
P.M., was asked the same question, again left the room, and finally, "[oln her return
read a prepared statement raising every conceivable objection"). Another criticism of
the practice of allowing counsel outside the jury room only is that the practice is not
constitutionally derived and therefore may be enjoyed only by those wealthy enough
to hire a lawyer. United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. at 608-09 (Brennan, J., concurr-
ing).
41. 387 So. 2d at 1143.
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By allowing the juvenile to be protected by counsel while testifying
before the grand jury, the Subpoenas case has taken an important
step in fully effectuating the rights enunciated in Dino.
The most intriguing aspect of the Subpoenas case is that it is
completely silent as to the function of the juvenile's attorney before
the grand jury. The case simply states that the juvenile is to be ac-
companied by an attorney, who is to be required to take the oath of
secrecy provided in article 441 of the Louisiana Code of Criminal
Procedure.42 At the least, the attorney must assist the juvenile in
the exercise or waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination,
since this seems to have been the court's primary concern in grant-
ing the right to counsel. However, absence of language in the court's
opinion concerning the function of the attorney before the grand
jury raises a question as to whether the attorney is free to provide
other services to the juvenile witness. Such services might include
pointing out other testimonial privileges of the witness, objecting to
questions designed to harass the witness and which have no bearing
on the matter under investigation, and pointing out elements of the
alleged offense missing from the evidence presented. This is an im-
portant consideration, since one of the most forceful arguments
against the right of counsel at the grand jury stage is that an
attorney's presence would disrupt the traditional order and format
of the proceedings. ' Certainly the prosecutor's domination of the
grand jury will be diminished to some extent. However, the
"[piresence of a lawyer at a hearing does not necessarily turn it into
a contentious or adversary proceeding, anymore than the presence
of a physician at an execution turns it into a medical treatment.""
One writer has suggested that:
[a]ny tendency of the lawyer to "interfere" with a grand jury
could be avoided completely by rules of procedure, just as there
are presently rules for that very purpose at the trial stage. For
instance, rules might deny the lawyer the right to ask questions
during the proceedings but provide that he may submit a list of
42. LA. CODE CRIM. P. art. 441 requires that an oath of secrecy be administered to
reporters and interpreters. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Dixon criticized the
majority opinion for requiring attorneys to take such an oath. He believes that the
threat of contempt proceedings for the violation of the oath of secrecy conflicts with
the discretionary powers of an attorney in dealing with his young clients. In re Grand
Jury Subpoenas, 387 So. 2d at 1143 (Dixon, C.J., concurring).
43. "Any holding that would saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary
showings would assuredly impede its investigation and frustrate the public's interest
in the fair and expeditious administration of the criminal laws." United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
44. Steele, supra note 12, at 204.
1312 [Vol. 41
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suggested questions to the foreman, to be used at his discretion.
Although the lawyer might be granted some opportunity to give
his opinion as to the chances of conviction, the rules could be
written so as to deny him the opportunity to make a pyrotechnic
summation. Currently, the grand jury is informed (implicitly at
least) of the prosecutor's estimate of the chances of conviction
when he recommends indictment. The validity of that recommen-
dation would certainly be enhanced if the grand jury had the
benefit of a reasoned opinion from the-suspect's own lawyer in
those cases where he cared to comment. Such a procedure would
force the prosecutor to exercise more responsibility in screening
cases before presenting them to the grand jury and would also
improve the grand jury's capacity to weed out cases that should
not have been presented."5
However, since the instant opinion contains no language limiting the
function of the juvenile's attorney, the proceeding could well become
adversarial during the testimony of the juvenile and immediately
thereafter if the attorney is allowed to summarize. This would alter
the traditional role of the grand jury and might make the jury itself
a more passive body which simply listens to the arguments of both
attorneys and then decides whether to return an indictment.
Hopefully, the Louisiana Supreme Court will soon delineate the
role the juvenile witness' attorney should assume before the grand
jury. The most appropriate solution would be for the legislature to
act under the authority granted in article V, section 34(B) of the
Louisiana Constitution.4" Under this grant of authority, the legis-
lature should explain under what conditions a juvenile witness should
be entitled to counsel before a grand jury and what role the at-
torney should take before that body. The writer submits that two
Washington statutes could serve as guidelines for such future legis-
lation. The first provides in part:
Such an individual [called to testify before a grand jury] has a
right to representation by an attorney to advise him as to his
rights, obligations and duties before the grand jury ... and must
be informed of this right. The attorney may be present during
all proceedings attended by his client unless immunity has been
granted. . . .After immunity has been granted, such an indi-
vidual may leave the grand jury room to confer with his attorney. 7
45. Id. at 205.
46. LA. CONST. art. V. § 34(B): "The legislature may establish by law terms and
conditions under which a witness may have the right to the advice of counsel while
testifying before the grand jury."
47. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.27.120 (1971).
1981] 1313
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The legislature could limit the statute to provide such a right only
to juveniles. The second statute provides in part: "The attorney ad-
vising the witness shall only advise such witness concerning his
right to answer or not to answer ... and shall not otherwise engage
in the proceedings.4 8
Such a statute would assure that the waiver requirements of
Dino are met and would in no significant way either "interfere with
the effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's duties," 9
"saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings [that]
would . . . impede its investigation,"5 or "delay and disrupt grand
jury proceedings."51 By avoiding these disruptive effects, such a
statute would maintain the integrity of the grand jury system and
would offer the greatest protection to the juvenile's right against
self-incrimination.
William Blake Bennett
THE PROBLEMATIC APPLICATION OF Succession of Brown
Plaintiffs, decedent father's four acknowledged illegitimate child-
ren, sued to annul a judgment of possession recognizing decedent's
adopted child as the sole heir. The plaintiffs attacked the constitu-
tionality of article 919 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which prohibits
acknowledged illegitimates from participating in the succession of
their father if he is survived by legitimate descendants, ascendants,
collateral relations, or spouse.' The trial court rendered judgment
rejecting the plaintiff's demands. This decision was reversed by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal, and the case was remanded for a
new judgment of possession to be entered, recognizing plaintiffs as
heirs.! The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, declaring article 919
48. Id at § 10.27.080 (1971).
49. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974).
50. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
51. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974).
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 919 provides:
Illegitimate children are called to the inheritance of their father, who has duly
acknowledged them, when he has left no descendants nor ascendants, nor col-
lateral relations, nor surviving wife, and to the exclusion only of the state.
In all other cases, they can only bring an action against their father or his heirs
for alimony, the amount of which shall be determined, as is directed in the Title:
Of Father and Child.
2. 379 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
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